Setting: Ft. Lauderdale Airport, Jan. 6th, 2017. An arriving passenger went to baggage claim, retrieved a handgun from his inbound luggage, and began shooting randomly, killing 5 and wounding 6 more. He was captured by police within 90 seconds, but 90 minutes thereafter, false reports of more gunfire circulated, initiating a second panicked “self-evacuation” out onto the AOA. Chaos ensued.
An excellent 82-page report available here provides considerable detail on the sequence of events and response, but in summary, the root of much of the problem was poor communications and coordination among the various agencies involved, preceded in large part by inadequate training and practice sessions.
The report notes that just having an EOC-SOC-AOC type facility in place, even with presumably trained personnel, is a big fig leaf that cannot compensate for the lack of clear lines of authority, lack of training exercises, the inability of local authorities and airport staff to coordinate under conditions of severe stress. An event like this is extremely difficult to anticipate, much less prepare for; there are so many variables, and so little time to improvise necessary actions when it’s not clear who’s in charge of what, and who can provide what resources.
The report lists six “positive attributes” among the airport and other responders, and quite generously lists 26 weaknesses in communications as “opportunities for improvement”. For example, about 2600 regional LEOs responded with no designated staging area for deployment, and at least three incident command posts were established by the Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO), the FBI, and Department of Fire & Rescue, with no communications among them or with the Country EOC. Responding agencies had conflicting situational awareness and didn’t know where to report or what their roles should be.
Among the major findings:
- No one took charge, leading to confusion among law enforcement, employees and passengers, many of whom simply self-evacuated with no guidance. The airport’s plans for evacuation and sheltering passengers after an incident require serious updates; airline plans deal with emergencies aboard planes.
- Lack of communication between the agencies led to duplicate requests for resources, such as buses and shelter areas; LEOs performing perimeter security duties lacked knowledge of some responders and transportation entities and denied them access during the event;
- Miscommunication with officials at Port Everglades who were initially told they needed to accommodate 900 evacuees; approximately 10,000 were eventually transported, requiring immediate transportation, family outreach, food and shelter, recovery of luggage, and much more.
- Buses trying to evacuate stranded travelers were delayed and blocked by police cars as officers flooded the airport after the false reports of more shooters.
Space in this article is limited, but there are literally dozens of lessons and recommendations for improving an airport’s approach to its emergency planning, training and practice regimens, particularly recognizing the many differences between natural hazards versus security-related shooter events; you are encouraged to review the full report at the link provided here. I guarantee that any airport leader with emergency event responsibilities will recognize at least a dozen issues at his or her own airport that could use some serious attention RIGHT NOW… reviewing and updating their AEP, followed by scheduling that long-overdue training exercise.
