The DHS Inspector General’s office recently issued a 41-page audit of the TSA Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, [ OIG-13-91 ], the intent of which is to observe passenger behavior that may be indicative of stress, fear, or deception in order to detect potential high-risk travelers. SPOT is right up there - #8 on the ubiquitous rainbow chart depicting TSA’s “20 Layers of Aviation Security”, and while the disappointing results of the audit come as no surprise to most security experts, one of the more curious statements is this admission by DHS:
This audit did not include work to determine the extent to which the SPOT program is
based on valid scientific principles for use as an effective layer of aviation security in the
United States.
In other words, even though the DHS audit notes several times that there are no objective criteria to measure, so we don’t know if SPOT really works or not, but let’s see if what they’re doing without much guidance is at least being done cost-effectively . It’s sort of like assigning a PhD in history to perform a specialized appraisal, and saying “I’m not a gynecologist, but I’ll take a look...”.
Let’s run some numbers: In the 5 years since SPOT began, the program has spent an estimated $878 million – a rough average of $175.6 million per year. In the 14-month period ending Dec. 30, 2012, passenger throughput was reported at 657,000,000, resulting in 37,370 SPOT records, 2,214 LEO referrals, and 199 arrests – about $882,412 per arrest, less than 9% of LEO referrals, 0.0053 of interviews. Seen from the other end, that’s a 91% “inaccuracy” rate - not knowing the details, I cannot call them errors, and I am the first to admit that being better safe than sorry is probably a good thing.
There were many ancillary problems and concerns addressed in the audit - TSA had no strategic plan, no criteria to assess the program’s effectiveness, no comprehensive training [the audit identified BDO instructors who did not have the knowledge, skills, or abilities to instruct BDO classes]; no financial plan, and in many cases, data collection procedures and criteria had little or no quality control or managerial review as specifically required by the SOPs. The recorded reasons for arrests included outstanding warrants, undeclared currency, suspected drugs, and illegal aliens, but no potential terrorists. The SPOT program has not addressed how these outputs achieve the SPOT program goals: to detect potential high-risk travelers who may pose a threat to transportation security.
Here’s a wonderful example of the lack of direction in the SPOT program: originally, BDOs looked for presumably anomalous behavior - a passenger who appears angry, irritated, upset, nervous, sweaty, or is otherwise less than quietly subservient in a confrontation with a TSA officer at the checkpoint. I have written previously that in less than 2 minutes I came up with 21 common everyday reasons why a perfectly normal non-terrorist person might exhibit most of those traits at an airport – I hit seven of them just writing about it. But now, not reaching career-enhancing levels of arrests, the BDOs have been given two new criteria to add to their bag of tricks: they will also target people who complain about TSA security, and people who do not exhibit the “expected” normal behaviors. Yes, you heard that right: the people who criticize TSA, and those who exhibit an absence of terrorist traits.
The DHS audit states:
As a result, TSA cannot ensure that passengers ....are screened objectively, show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program’s expansion.
Its’ demise can’t come soon enough. But now that their jobs are protected by union representation, I suggest those officers would make fine exit lane guards.
