Security 101
In the 21st Century, we need to alter the rules of engagement
By David E. Forbes
January 2002
David Forbes has been trained at the New Scotland Yard Detective Training School, served as a police inspector in the U.K., been recognized by FAA for his work in helping regulate international security, and has assisted in programs and practices related to global express security. Today a U.S.-based consultant, Forbes relates what he sees as previous flaws in aviation security and some changes that are needed.
Countries that are members of the International
Civil Aviation Organiza-tion (ICAO) are supposedly parties to mutually
agreed protocols. In practice, each country determines its own priorities
and methodologies for the protection of its commercial airline operations.
An examination of member country practices would show a diverse range
of methodologies and standards.
The most visible difference within the U.S.
domestic aviation system through the last decades is the absence of total
baggage screening and reconciliation, and in consequence the lack of a
policy for removing baggage from the belly hold of an aircraft when the
person to whom it belongs is not on board at departure. This apparent
unwillingness to meet the challenge has been cosmetically tempered by
the lip service of asking a check-in passenger questions about the history
of the baggage.
The inability to grasp the nettle has permeated
further into airline industry operations, but is less obvious. The passenger
being processed through an X-ray and metal detector screening system is
generally unaware of the extent or effectiveness of security measures
applied to other aspects of the upcoming flight, such as screening of
cargo and mail, and of the integrity of ramp access employees and their
equipment. That is left to trust — of airports, airlines, and government.
That trust is routinely betrayed across
the industry on the simple premise that if you are not caught, it didn’t
happen. In those instances when we know it happened (Pan Am 103, ValuJet)
the greater price has been paid by innocent passengers, not by guilty
operators. The American baggage and cargo security systems are now so
far behind the curve that recent legislation has created an impossible
timeline for desired screening goals.
The security routines and systems that have
become so familiar to us have simultaneously become predictable. The security
focus has not been on a consistent but versatile application of a strong
and well-managed security threat identification strategy.
Consider the agency
The relationship between the principal parties
in commercial aviation has led to a conspiracy of incompetence. The FAA
writes the rules but only after a laborious consultative process whereby
an artificial consensus is achieved from the industry. Aggressive lobbying
at one extreme and indifference at the other is sometimes compounded by
delayed adverse reactions from those who come to realize very late that
new and inconvenient security rules are close to implementation.
The alleged federal watchdog, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), has since 1988 published dozens of reports, many
of them criticizing the FAA for its serious failings, such as the stated
objectives and goals for airport security that have not been achieved
in an acceptable timeframe. An erratic and somewhat arbitrary application
of some FAA-generated rules directed at some, not all, airports has added
more weight to the impression that FAA has no security strategy, inadequate
resources to address all the security issues that deserve attention, and
ultimately a woefully inadequate cadre of talent capable of delivering
a secure air travel system.
Penalties such as fines levied against airports,
airlines, and security screening companies, among others, have been shrugged
off without the public at large knowing of it or having the opportunity
to recognize the weaknesses in the system.
The downstream flow of DOT/FAA regulatory
direction has not been met with a consistent airline/airport upstream
readiness to be held accountable. When writing new rules there has been
a pervasive over-compensation for concern about the cost of requiring
airlines, airports, integrated cargo carriers, and others to invest in
technology. Resistance to control has rarely been challenged, and delayed
introduction of protection measures has been accepted as quite normal
and therefore tolerable.
A need for law, and for business
Rulemaking is not the same as law enforcement,
but rule breakers where lives are at stake should be treated as lawbreakers.
Simultaneously, there is a desperate need
for the best business minds of the country to bring in the wind of change
from the commercial perspective. The strange processes that have led to
the FAA embarking upon deployment of certain types of security technology
are a primary part of this need for change. The post-Lockerbie (Pan Am
103) fiasco involving the ’quick fix’ but pilot program purchase
of Thermal Neutron Analysis scanning machines and the apparent underusage
of airport CTX equipment in the ’90s, are but two examples. The question
has to be asked as to whether the search for good security technology
has been sufficiently wide, deep, and concentrated to enable the best
solutions to rise more quickly to the surface.
A critical missing component in the successful application of aviation security has been the failure to understand and employ the real value of security as an asset to society and as a protector of the airline business.
About the Author
David Forbes serves as CEO of Quo Vadis
International, a Denver-based security consulting firm. In his 34 years
in security and law enforcement, he has served as a police inspector,
security advisor, and led development of a global and multicultural security
management team for TNT Express Worldwide. He currently is working with
the Colorado State Capitol on upgrading its security.
